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The financial strains recently experienced by some emerging market 
economies (EMEs) reflect growing global interdependence, which has 
accentuated these countries’ exposure to international economic and 
financial events. Specifically, in the past year, EMEs have been shaken 
by the effects of the trade tensions between China and the United 
States, and to those arising from the US fiscal and monetary policy 
mix, which have prompted an appreciation of the dollar and a 
tightening of international financial conditions.1
However, the deterioration in the EMEs’ financial indicators has 
not been uniform; rather, investors have taken the degree of 
vulnerability of the different countries into account in their portfolio 
decisions, as was the case in previous bouts of turbulence linked 
to changes in US financial conditions, the so-called “taper 
tantrum” from May to August 2013 being a case in point. 
Specifically, in the episode from April to September 2018, the 
financial tensions particularly affected those economies with 
sizeable vulnerabilities, in particular in terms of a weak external 
position (see Charts 1 and 2). The two countries that most suffered 
in this phase of instability were Argentina and Turkey, which have 
already been the subject of recent detailed analysis.2
This box assesses the current degree of vulnerability in EMEs as a 
whole, before focusing on the most relevant countries, either in 
terms of their weight in global activity and their systemic relevance 
(as is the case of China), or because of their importance to the 
Spanish economy (Brazil and Mexico).3
The indicators habitually used to examine the emerging economies’ 
vulnerabilities include some relating to their external position 
(current account balance, external debt and international reserves), 
their fiscal stance (budget deficit and public debt), their 
macroeconomic situation (GDP growth and inflation), the 
soundness of their banking systems (credit growth, traditional 
funding via deposits versus external financing) and political risks.4 
In aggregate terms, when considering this set of indicators the 
diagnosis about whether the degree of vulnerability is higher or 
lower currently compared with the aforementioned episode in 
2013 is not clear, since some of these indicators have improved, 
but others have worsened (see Chart 3). In particular, inflation has 
fallen compared with five years earlier (from 5% to 3.8%), growth 
rates have remained high (slightly over 5% in both cases) and the 
situation of the banking sector is sounder (their banks’ net external 
assets have risen from 0.5% to 2% of GDP). Conversely, the fiscal 
margin has now diminished (the average deficit has dipped from 
2.1% of GDP in 2013 to 3.5% in 2018 Q1), public debt and external 
debt ratios have risen, international reserves have fallen and the 
geostrategic risk indicators and domestic political tensions are 
greater than they were in 2013.5 . Furthermore, from a shorter time 
perspective, the emerging economies’ vulnerability has increased 
in the external and fiscal arena since early 2017. 
As to the three individual economies considered, the main risks in the 
case of Brazil are in the fiscal domain, since the budget deficit has been 
standing above 7% of GDP for three years and public debt has climbed 
to 77.2% of GDP, a historical high (see Chart 4). Against this background, 
it is essential to curb the expected high growth of Social Security 
spending, through the reform of the pension system, which has been 
pending for over a year.6 Further, there are several factors of vulnerability 
in some financial institutions, including banks and investment funds, 
which have absorbed a very high proportion of new government debt 
issues, and in public-sector banks, owing to the segmentation of credit 
markets (in which almost half of total loans have been granted at 
subsidised interest rates by public banks, as opposed to the rest, 
granted at higher rates – and with bigger margins – by private banks, 
which are concentrated in segments such as consumer credit). These 
factors have given rise to a deterioration in the sector’s valuation by 
analysts and investors. However, other indicators have tended to 
improve recently. The usual indicators of political uncertainty, which 
had risen owing to the uncertainty surrounding the presidential vote, 
have abated following these elections. Moreover, Brazil has managed 
to adjust its current account deficit in recent years (from 4.4% of GDP 
in early 2015 to 0.5% in 2018, Chart 4), meaning external debt has 
fallen slightly. Inflation, meanwhile, has been substantially cut from 
10.8% on average in 2015 to 4.5% in September 2018. Finally, reserves 
stand at historical highs ($338 billion), with very limited exposure by the 
public sector to the external sector. 
The fiscal position is also a factor of vulnerability in Mexico, 
although the imbalances are far lower than in Brazil: the budget 
deficit has held at between 2.5% and 3% of GDP since 2010, 
while public debt increased by more than 10 pp from 2010 to 
2016, stabilising thereafter at around 45% of GDP (see Chart 5). 
On the contrary, the current account imbalance and external debt 
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VULNERABILITIES IN THE EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España, Datastream, IIF and JP Morgan.
a Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Tunisia and Nigeria.
b India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey.
c Standardised series with average and standard deviation from 2008. Outward movement by the variables entails greater vulnerability.
d The dotted line depicts reserves as a percentage of GDP were Mexico to receive the $88 bn of the FCL entered into with the IMF.
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have been adjusted in the past two years and international 
reserves, despite having fallen, hold above their historical average. 
Moreover, in this latter area, Mexico has a Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL) with the IMF worth $88 billion, half its current reserves. 
In the case of China, the main vulnerabilities stem from the trade 
tensions with the United States and, from a more structural 
perspective, from the ongoing re-balancing of the Chinese economy 
towards a growth model based more on the services sector and 
private consumption, and less on investment and exports, with very 
high rates of corporate debt. In the transition from one model to the 
other, the Chinese authorities face the dilemma, in the current 
context of less favourable external conditions, of choosing between 
maintaining the pace of the process of transformation, on one hand, 
and supporting economic growth, on the other, even though this 
may check the correction of its macrofinancial imbalances. Against 
this backdrop, the corporate debt ratio exceeded 150% of GDP in 
2017; that said, the proportion accounted for by shadow banking in 
this figure has declined at the expense of bank lending, which has 
grown at a real rate of 9% in the past two years.7
The financial vulnerabilities of the Chinese economy are also 
significant. Firstly, banks increasingly resort to the markets for 
financing (the issuance of certificates of deposits in 2017 and 
2018 doubled) which, together with the slowdown in deposits, has 
raised the loan/deposits ratio to close to unity. Secondly, a strong 
increase in Chinese banks’ and real estate development 
companies’ bond issues on international markets was observed 
throughout 2017, which might entail certain risks when these 
sectors have to face their external debt maturities, most of which 
are concentrated in the next three years (see Chart 6). 
Notwithstanding, China continues to hold a high volume of 
international reserves ($3.1 trillion) and its levels of external and 
public debt are low, which affords it substantial room for 
manoeuvre.
In short, analysis of the vulnerabilities of the main emerging 
economies points to an increase in fiscal imbalances in the cases 
of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico, and to high corporate 
sector debt in China. Nonetheless, the high volumes of reserves in 
China and Brazil (along with Mexico’s contingent borrowing 
arrangement with the IMF) and the healthy external position of 
these economies are factors that offer a degree of protection to 
mitigate the effect of the potential risks that might arise in a setting 
of tighter global financing conditions and uncertainty over 
international trade developments. 
7  See, in this connection, Box 3 (“Some implications of the announced 
expansionary stance of China’s macroeconomic policies”), “Quarterly 
Report on the Spanish Economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2018, Banco de 
España.
